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Abstract
We study whether coordination failure is more often overcome if players can easily dis-
close their actions. In an experiment subjects first choose their action and then choose
whether to disclose this action to other group members, and disclosure costs are varied
between treatments. We find that no group overcomes coordination failure when action
disclosure costs are high, but half of the groups do so when the costs are low. Simulations
with a belief learning model can predict which groups will overcome coordination failure,
but only if it is assumed that players are either farsighted, risk-seeking or pro-social. To
distinguish between these explanations we collected additional data on individual prefer-
ences and the degree of farsightedness. We find that in the low cost treatment players
classified as more farsighted more often deviate from an inefficient convention and disclose
this action, while the effect of risk and social preferences is not significant.
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1. Introduction
Governments in Tunisia and Egypt remained in power for more than two decades until
they were swiftly overthrown by a wave of protests. Success of the protest movements has
often been attributed to information and communication technologies (ICT) that spread
at the onset of the protest movements and were used by many protesters,1 but is has
also been argued that the role of ICT has been exaggerated and it may have had adverse
effects.2 A better understanding of the role played by ICT in the democratization process
would have important implications for public policy, yet scientific evidence is lacking and
the few studies that do address this question use empirical country-level data, making the
causal relationship hard to establish (see Kedzie, 1997, Best and Wade, 2009, and a review
in Meier, 2011). One way to establish causality is to run an experiment, and we do so
by varying one aspect of information technology – lower costs to disseminate information
about events – in a controlled laboratory environment.
In the experiment we use a critical mass game that has been used to model the dilemma
faced by citizens in oppressed countries (Angeletos et al., 2007; Edmond, 2013) and we
also implement two features that inhibit revolts in real world situations: the history of no
revolts and imperfect observability of revolt levels. In a critical mass game participants
choose between a safe action (call it “stay out”) with a fixed payoff, and a risky action
(call it “revolt”) that pays a large payoff if sufficiently many group members choose this
action. Three outcomes are possible in this game: efficient coordination, when everyone is
revolting, coordination failure, when everyone is staying out, and miscoordination, when
both actions are played by some participants.3 Even though the situation in which everyone
is revolting is preferred by all citizens, it may not be implemented due to the history of no
revolts and imperfect observability of the actions taken by others. The history of no revolts
establishes an inefficient convention, as defined by Lewis (1969) and Young (1996): staying
out is customary (everyone has been staying out), expected (everyone expects others to stay
out) and self-enforcing (staying out is optimal as long as others do so). In the experiment
an inefficient convention was established by starting the game with a high participation
threshold, which in similar games leads to coordination on the inefficient equilibrium (e.g.
Brandts and Cooper, 2006a). Efficient coordination may also be inhibited by imperfect
observability of revolt levels because participants are unable to observe deviations from an
1For example, almost half of the protesters in Egypt said that they have taken and shared pictures
or videos of the protests (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012) and social networking services in both Egypt and
Tunisia were primarily used to raise awareness inside the country about the civil movements (Mourtada
and Salem, 2011)
2It has been stated that social media may be a result rather than a cause of discontent with the
regime (Shirky, 2011), online activism may crowd out activism in the streets (Morozov, 2012) and protests
movements are not hampered by attempts to shut down communication channels (Hassanpour, 2014). For
a broader overview of the debate see Kalathil and Boas (2003), Morozov (2012) or Lynch (2011).
3The term “coordination failure” may be used to denote failure to coordinate on an equilibrium, but
we use terminology that is consistent with the literature, such as Van Huyck et al. (1991) and Devetag
and Ortmann (2007).
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inefficient convention. However, observability is improved if players can use information
technology, which provides an easier way to disclose information about one’s actions. In
the experiment we gave players an option to disclose their action by paying a certain cost,
and only disclosed actions were observed in the feedback stage. Disclosure costs were varied
across treatments: disclosure was cheap in the LOW treatment but expensive in the HIGH
treatment.
The first goal of our study is to determine whether lower disclosure costs help overcome
coordination failure. We find that they do: half of the groups overcome coordination failure
in LOW, while no group does so in HIGH. This treatment difference cannot be explained
by differences in histories because all groups in both treatments experience coordination
failure when the participation threshold is high. The treatment difference is small even
immediately following the decrease in the threshold, but afterwards the gap starts to emerge
and in the end half of the groups in LOW overcome coordination failure while no group in
HIGH does so. All groups that overcome coordination failure sustain efficient coordination
even when the participation threshold is increased back to its original level, leading to a
persistent gap between two treatments. We show that the treatment difference can be
explained by a learning model and initial treatment differences in terms of disclosure rates.
Our second goal is to understand the motivation behind the decision to deviate from
the inefficient convention. These deviations could be myopically optimal given beliefs and
preferences, or they could be used strategically, to influence the future choices of other
group members. Although the strategic teaching hypothesis has been postulated as a
potential reason for deviations (Brandts and Cooper, 2006a, Devetag, 2003, Friedman,
1996), no attempt has been made to test the existence of such strategic motives. Our
experiment is designed to do exactly that because players who revolt solely for myopic
reasons would never use costly action disclosure, while strategic players would disclose if
the cost was lower than the expected increase in future earnings. Models with strategic
players would therefore predict that some players would disclose their actions after choosing
to revolt and that such disclosures would be observed more often in LOW. Moreover, we
collected additional data on beliefs, risk attitudes, pro-social preferences and farsightedness
that allow us to identify the types of players who are most likely to initiate revolts.
We find evidence that deviations from an inefficient convention are motivated by strate-
gic considerations. Many players are willing to pay to disclose their actions and disclosures
are systematic: revolts are disclosed much more often than stay outs and disclosures are
most frequent at the start of each block. We also find that in LOW subjects classified as
more farsighted tend to initiate revolts more often.
1.1. Related Literature
Experiments on overcoming coordination failure in coordination games have been con-
ducted by Brandts and Cooper (2006a) and Hamman et al. (2007), although their focus
on coordination failures in organizations has lead to different design choices.4 Both studies
4The game used in this study does not have the weak-link structure, thus it is not necessary for all
participants to cooperate for the efficient equilibrium to be reached (although we do use a weak-link
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find that whether a group overcomes coordination failure can be predicted by the outcomes
in the first round, and some players (called “leaders” by Brandts and Cooper, 2006a) are
more likely to initiate the transition than others (“laggards”). Our study extends these
findings by showing that whether a person is a leader or a laggard partly depends on their
farsightedness level.
Other studies have focused on the role of feedback in coordination games. Brandts
and Cooper (2006b) show that groups receiving full feedback about the choices of other
participants overcome coordination failure more often than groups receiving information
only about the minimum effort level. Devetag (2003) finds that full feedback improves
efficient coordination in a game that is similar to ours, but without the initial period of
inefficient coordination. On the other hand, Van Huyck et al. (1990) note that informing
players about the distribution of actions does not improve coordination in a minimum
effort game. In our study the level of feedback is determined endogenously, allowing us to
investigate not only the effects, but also the causes of action disclosure. Also, heterogeneity
in received feedback allows us to investigate the relationship between observed actions and
choices more precisely and to determine how efficient coordination is affected by small
increases in observed actions.
Another factor that improves efficient coordination is pre-play communication (Cooper
et al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007), but in many situations, both in the lab and in
the field, explicit communication is not possible. However, even without explicit commu-
nication players are often able to send signals to others using their actions, as long as these
actions are observed. Action disclosure decisions allow us to determine whether players are
willing to send such signals even when doing so is costly and whether these signals increase
the rates of efficient coordination.
Although the strategic teaching hypothesis has not been tested in N -person coordi-
nation games, it was tested in two player games with two Pareto-ranked Nash equilib-
ria (Hyndman et al., 2009), three non Pareto-ranked equilibria (Terracol and Vaksmann,
2009) and a unique equilibrium (Hyndman et al., 2012). All three studies find evidence for
strategic teaching by showing that (efficient) coordination is less likely when: (i) the cost
of strategic teaching is increased (Hyndman et al., 2009), (ii) players are rematched in each
round or (iii) information about the payoffs of other players is not displayed (Hyndman
et al., 2012). We contribute to the strategic teaching literature in several ways. First, we
investigate whether strategic teaching is possible in games with more than two players.
For strategic teaching to be profitable in two player coordination games the teacher must
be able to affect the beliefs of the other party about one’s future choices. In N -person
games strategic teaching by one player may be not enough, even if all other players are
structure in the first block of the game, as it has been shown that in such games most groups converge to
the inefficient equilibrium); after the initial block in which groups coordinate on the inefficient equilibrium,
literature on coordination failure in organizations changes the bonus that is paid to group members if the
efficient equilibrium is achieved, while we model a decrease in the strength of the regime by lowering the
participation threshold; participants in our experiment choose one of two actions, leading to two Nash
equilibria, while the strategy space and the number of equilibria in the minimum effort game are larger.
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receptive learners. To find strategic teaching profitable, players must expect that others
are using strategic teaching too, and each player would prefer others to perform strategic
teaching rather than performing it themselves, leading to a collective action problem and
potentially lowering the willingness to use strategic teaching. Second, we test the strategic
teaching hypothesis in a different way and using a smaller treatment manipulation, making
it unlikely that the treatment difference could be explained by a theory that is not based
on players acting strategically.5 Costly action disclosure also allows us to identify teaching
attempts more precisely, and we show that some personal characteristics, in particular
farsightedness, can partly explain why some players use strategic teaching while others do
not.
More generally, the critical mass game resembles other repeated coordination games
with strategic complementarities, complete information and more than two players, such
as entry games (Heinemann et al., 2004; Duffy and Ochs, 2012), order-statistic games
(Van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991, 2007; Kogan et al., 2011), games with network externalities
(Ruﬄe et al., 2010; Mak and Zwick, 2010) and step-level public goods games (Rapoport
and Eshed-Levy, 1989; Offerman et al., 1996; Sonnemans et al., 1998). For similar one-shot
games, see Heinemann et al. (2009) or Keser et al. (2012). Global games of regime change
use a similar payoff function, but assume incomplete information about the participation
threshold (Angeletos et al., 2007, tested in an experiment by Shurchkov, 2013).
Several theoretical studies in political science proposed a hypothesis that political action
could be taken strategically, to increase future turnout levels. Lohmann (1994, 1993, 2000)
develops a signaling theory of mass action in which citizens with private information about
regime strength take part in mass political action to induce others to join; De Mesquita
(2010) models a coordination game with uncertainty about the level of anti-government
sentiment, and vanguards undertake some costly action (e.g. acts of terror) to make the
anti-government support seem larger and increase future revolt levels; Edmond (2013) uses
a model in which citizens are not perfectly informed about the strength of the regime and
thus the regime has incentives to provide biased information. Although the setting which
we analyze is different from any of these theoretical models,6 our experiment reinforces the
view that participation in political action could be used strategically.
5Findings made in two player games, while consistent with strategic teaching, might also be explained
by other factors: larger costs of strategic teaching would lower the likelihood that a player will choose an
efficient action even for players who are myopic but choose stochastically; rematching players every round
could increase strategic uncertainty and make learning more difficult; social preferences might be switched
off when players are not informed about payoffs of other participants, leading to different choices.
6De Mesquita (2010) and Edmond (2013) assume uncertainty about the strength of the regime (cor-
responding to the participation threshold in this study) or the preferences of the population. A strategic
player thus affects the actions of other players by altering their beliefs about the unknown variable. The
experiment in this study makes the strength of the regime public knowledge, and the preferences of all
participants are aligned, but there is strategic uncertainty that can be affected by a strategic choice.
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2. Experimental Design
At the start of the experiment participants were matched into groups of six and played
a variant of a critical mass game (Heinemann et al., 2009; Devetag, 2003) for 33 rounds. In
each round players went through four steps: they (i) chose an action, (ii) chose whether to
disclose this action, (iii) reported beliefs about the actions chosen by other group members
and (iv) received feedback about the actions of the group members who disclosed their
actions.
2.1. Action Choice
In each round participants chose an action, R (for “risky” or “revolt”) or S (for “safe”
or “stay out”).7 The payoff of S was fixed while the payoff of R depended on whether the
total number of players who chose R (denoted by #R) exceeded the participation threshold
(denoted by θ):
pipRq 
#
100 ECU if #R ¥ θ
5 ECU if #R   θ
pipSq  60 ECU
This payoff function with 2 ¤ θ ¤ 6 leads to two Pareto-ranked stage game Nash equilibria
in pure strategies:8 in the efficient equilibrium everyone chooses R and in the inefficient
one everyone chooses S.
Our main objective is to study how an efficiency-improving transition could take place
following coordination failure. To establish coordination failure we divided the game into
three blocks and set the participation threshold equal to 6 in the first one, so that 100
ECU is received only if all six players in a group choose R. With this parameter choice,
a critical mass game reduces to a binary minimum effort game, in which large groups
typically converge to the inefficient equilibrium (Van Huyck et al., 1990). To test whether
coordination failure can be overcome we made efficient coordination easier in the second
block by reducing the participation threshold to 5. In the third block the threshold was
increased back to 6 to test if the history of efficient coordination improves coordination in
a more difficult environment.
The transfer of precedent from one block to the other was facilitated by keeping all
elements of the game constant, except for the participation threshold, and by framing the
game in terms of several blocks in a game rather than as separate games. At the start of
each block players were informed about the duration of the current block (13 rounds in
7In the experiment we used neutral language, labeling actions as “A” and “B”. Screenshots of the
decision screen are reproduced in Appendix I
8There also are stage game equilibria in mixed strategies. In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium all
players choose R with probability I111
19
pθ1, nθ 1q , where I1 is an inverse of the regularised incomplete
beta function. In this equilibrium R is chosen with probability 0.72 if θ  5, and with probability 0.90 if
θ  6.
6
block 1, 15 rounds in block 2, 5 rounds in block 3) and about the value of the participation
threshold, but no information was provided about the parameter values in future blocks.
2.2. Action Disclosure, Belief Elicitation and Feedback
After choosing an action, R or S, players had an option to disclose their action to
other group members. The cost of not disclosing an action was 1 ECU, while the cost of
disclosing depended on the treatment to which a player was assigned:
• In LOW the disclosure cost was 2 ECU.
• In HIGH the cost was 80 ECU.
After the action disclosure stage we elicited beliefs using a procedure adapted from
Heinemann et al. (2009): players were asked to report the probability that a randomly
selected other group member will choose R in the current round. The belief elicitation
task was incentivised and we used a binarized scoring rule that elicits truthful beliefs even
if subjects are not risk neutral (Hossain and Okui, 2013). In coordination games stated
beliefs may not be truthful because of hedging (see Armantier and Treich, 2013), therefore
we reduced the incentives to hedge by paying either for the main part of the experiment
or by playing a lottery in which the probability to receive the higher prize was determined
by performance in a randomly selected belief elicitation task. Details about the belief
elicitation task are presented in Appendix D.
At the end of each round players were informed only about the actions taken by group
members who disclosed their actions. In particular, players were informed about:
• The total number of group members who chose R and disclosed (“observed R”)
• The total number of group members who chose S and disclosed (“observed S”)
• The total number of group members who did not disclose their actions (“unobserved”)
In addition, players were informed about their round income and whether at least θ players
chose R. A history box displaying own actions, stated beliefs and observed feedback in
previous rounds was always visible on the computer screen. Feedback about the accuracy
of reported beliefs was provided only at the end of the experiment to suppress information
about the choices of group members who did not disclose their actions.
2.3. Procedure
Experiments were conducted in the BEElab at Maastricht University in February, 2014,
using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). 72 participants took part
in the experiment, 36 in each treatment. The average duration of the experiment was 100
minutes and average earnings were 18.50 euros. Earnings in all parts of the experiment
were denoted in ECU and exchanged into euros using the conversion rate of 250 ECU = 1
EUR. Negative round income was possible in HIGH, therefore in both treatments players
started with an initial balance of 400 ECU.
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After reading the instructions but before starting the experiment subjects answered
several questions about the payment scheme and calculated earnings in hypothetical situa-
tions to ensure that instructions were well understood (questions are reproduced in figures
I.9 and I.10 in Appendix I). The questionnaire was computerised and subjects could not
continue until all the questions have been correctly answered.
2.4. Theoretical Predictions
In each stage game players chose an action (R or S) and whether to disclose it (D)
or not (ND), thus each player had four strategies: (R, D), (R, ND), (S, D) and (S, ND).
Disclosure is costly, therefore (R, ND) dominates (R, D) and (S, ND) dominates (S, D) so
no action should be disclosed if a stage game was played once or if all players were myopic.
However, actions might be disclosed on the path of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) in the repeated game. For example, consider a strategy that prescribes R if all
players disclosed their actions in all previous rounds and prescribes S otherwise. There is a
SPNE in which all players use such strategies, and on the equilibrium path all players would
be choosing R and disclosing their actions in all but the last round as long as disclosure
costs are sufficiently small. In a similar way, there are SPNE in which players do not
coordinate on a common action if, for example, all players use strategies that prescribe R
only following such history of miscoordination.
Nash equilibrium is useful in making predictions about stage-game outcomes that may
be reached in the long run, but the multiplicity of equilibria leads to vacuous predictions
about the dynamic process in a repeated game. An alternative approach is to assume
that players are boundedly rational and learn from experience. In particular, we will
make predictions about the path of choices using a weighted fictitious play model (Che-
ung and Friedman, 1997), which typically fits data better than reinforcement learning in
coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (Battalio et al., 1997) and which can be
extended with sophistication (Hyndman et al., 2009, Masiliunas, 2015). Weighted fictitious
play assumes that players form beliefs based on observed history and choose an action that
maximises immediate utility conditional on those beliefs. The model predicts that players
who observed others choosing a particular action will expect this action to be chosen more
often, and will therefore be more likely to choose this action themselves. We formulate this
first prediction the following way:
Prediction M1. Players who observe action R chosen more often are more likely to choose
R and to believe that others will choose R.
However, players in learning models assume that others are using stationary strategies,
ignoring the possibility that others may be learning. These models therefore overlook
strategic teaching, which may explain deviations from an inefficient convention. To test
whether behaviour is driven by such strategic motives we extend the learning model by
adding sophistication, and we compare the predictions of this model to the predictions
of a standard learning model. The experiment was designed in a way such that the two
learning models would make different predictions, allowing us to determine: (i) whether
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choice dynamics can be accurately approximated by belief learning and (ii) whether the
explanatory power of a learning model is increased by adding sophistication.
We add sophistication to the standard learning model by assuming that some players
are sophisticated and others are myopic. Myopic players act as predicted by the standard
belief learning model (see prediction M1). Sophisticated players anticipate the learning
process of myopic players and take into account not only the differences in immediate
expected payoffs, but also the differences in future payoff flows generated by each action.
A solution concept for N -person critical mass games with sophisticated and myopic players
is presented in Masiliunas (2015); here we will only use the features of the model that are
useful in making predictions about the treatment difference.9
Sophisticated players may deviate from an inefficient convention to increase future
payoffs from efficient coordination. Furthermore, sophisticated players would be willing to
pay to make their deviations observable because they value a deviation for its informational
content rather than for the immediate payoff it generates. A decision to not deviate should
not be disclosed because it makes myopic players less likely to choose R in the future,
which can only decrease the payoffs of sophisticated players.
Prediction S1. Action S is never disclosed, R is disclosed more often than S.
The model with sophistication also predicts differences in disclosure rates between the
two treatments. Action R should be disclosed more often in LOW than in HIGH because
lower disclosure costs reduce the cost of strategic teaching. Since action S should never be
disclosed, its disclosure rates should not depend on disclosure costs.
Prediction S2. R is more often disclosed in LOW than in HIGH.
In addition to the immediate effect of action disclosure, lower disclosure costs are pre-
dicted to help overcome coordination failure. This prediction follows from predictions M1,
S1 and S2. Notice that S1 and S2 predict that only R will be disclosed, and more so in
LOW, therefore M1 predicts that over time the learning process should lead to higher R
levels in LOW than in HIGH. Higher R levels result in an increased frequency of instances
when θ or more players choose R, in which case coordination failure would be overcome.
Prediction S3. R is more frequently chosen and coordination failure is more often over-
come in LOW than in HIGH.
Finally, players with a longer planning horizon would be more likely to deviate from an
inefficient convention because they put more weight on future benefits of efficient coordi-
nation.
Prediction S4. The tendency to choose R and disclose it is higher among farsighted
subjects.
9For alterantive ways to model sophistication see Milgrom and Roberts (1991), Kalai and Lehrer (1993)
or Camerer et al. (2002)
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It is important to note that predictions S1, S2, S3 and S4 would not hold if all players
were myopic, because no myopic player would be willing to pay to disclose an action.10
Predictions S1, S2, S3 and S4 are therefore not only interesting on their own, but they also
help to test whether players are motivated by strategic considerations.
3. Experimental Results and Analysis
We address two main questions in this section. First, we want to know if lower action
disclosure costs help overcome coordination failure. Second, we want to see if the transition
process can be explained by a learning model, either with sophistication or without it.
3.1. Is Coordination Failure More Often Overcome with Low Action Disclosure Costs?
We compare the treatments in terms of two measures: R levels, defined as the total
number of players in a group who choose R, and transition frequency, defined as the fraction
of groups that coordinate on S in the end of block 1 and go on to coordinate on R by the
end of block 2. The former metric captures the willingness to initiate a transition while
the latter measures the success of these efforts.
3.1.1. Differences in R Levels
θ = 6 θ = 5 θ = 6
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Figure 1: Comparison of R levels, by treatment. Vertical dashed lines separate the three blocks
with different values of θ.
In block 1 there is no significant treatment difference in terms of R levels (figure 1).
In both treatments about half of the players choose R in round 1, but afterwards R levels
10Action disclosure could be myopically optimal only if players were willing to throw away money to
reduce advantageous inequality (β ¡ 1 in the model of Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). We tested the existence
of such preferences in an additional task, where players could reduce their earnings without affecting the
earnings of the other person. We found that such preferences were rare: 94% of the sample chose not to
decrease their own earings.
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Table 1: Random effects GLS regression using group level data (12 groups). Dependent variable:
number of players in a group who choose R. Standard errors clustered on the group
level.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
LOW treatment 0.060 3.437** 2.900**
(0.24) (2.44) (2.20)
Rounds remaining 0.172*** 0.155*** 0.133***
(3.81) (2.90) (2.76)
Rounds remaining * LOW treatment 0.009 -0.143** 0.000
(0.15) (-2.28) (0.00)
Constant -0.353*** -0.450*** -0.100**
(-2.79) (-2.94) (-2.28)
Observations 156 180 60
t statistics in parentheses
* p 0.10, ** p 0.05, *** p 0.01
decrease until almost nobody is choosing R at the end of block 1. In the last five rounds of
block 1 the fraction of players who choose R is 6% in LOW and 3% in HIGH while average
beliefs about R choice are respectively 14% and 13%. A high participation threshold
therefore leads to coordination failure regardless of disclosure costs.
The effect of disclosure costs becomes apparent when the participation threshold is
lowered in block 2. The treatment difference in round 14 is small and insignificant (Mann-
Whitney U test p ¡ 0.4810) as a decreased participation threshold leads to a similar jump
in both treatments. However, the gap between two treatments soon widens and eventually
almost all players in HIGH stop choosing R while average R levels hardly change in LOW.
Result 1. R levels in LOW are significantly higher than in HIGH in blocks 2 and 3, but
there is no significant difference in block 1. In block 2 the treatment difference increases
over time.
Result 1 can be formally supported by regressing R levels on the treatment variable,
number of rounds remaining until the end of the block and the interaction of these two
variables. Table 1 shows that the main effect of the treatment variable is significantly
different from zero in blocks 2 and 3, but not in block 1.11 We use the estimated coefficients
to predict the treatment difference in each round (table B.10 in Appendix B) and find no
significant treatment difference in block 1 and at the start of block 2, but a significant
difference at the end of block 2 and in block 3. The observation that the gap between two
treatments grows over time in block 2 is also evident from the negative coefficient of the
interaction term in the second column of table 1.
11If we do not include the interaction term, the treatment coefficient is significant in block 2 and 3 at a
5% level and not significant in block 1.
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3.1.2. Differences in Transition Frequency
A large difference between two treatments is also observed if the comparison is per-
formed using transition frequency instead of R levels. Convergence patterns on a group
level are illustrated in figure 2. All groups converge to an inefficient equilibrium in the
first block, and no group is in equilibrium in round 14, following a change in the partici-
pation threshold. However, whether a group moves to the efficient equilibrium in block 2
depends on the treatment: in HIGH all groups return to the inefficient equilibrium, while
in LOW half of the groups move to the efficient one. The flat line of average R levels
in LOW shown in figure 1 therefore does not tell the entire story: while no group is in
equilibrium in round 14, all converge to one by round 18. All three groups in LOW that
overcome coordination failure in block 2 stay in the efficient equilibrium in block 3, when
the participation threshold is increased to its original value. A temporary decrease in the
participation threshold can therefore have a lasting positive effect on coordination.
Result 2. No groups overcome coordination failure in HIGH. Half of the groups overcome
coordination failure in LOW.
Group #3
Group #4
Group #9
Group #10
Group #11
Group #12
Group #1
Group #2
Group #5
Group #6
Group #7
Group #8
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34
HIGH treatment LOW treatment
Efficient equilibrium Inefficient equilibrium
G
r o
u
p
Round
Figure 2: Convergence by group. A group is said to be in an efficient equilibrium if all group
members choose R and in an inefficient equilibrium if all group members choose S.
Empty space denotes rounds in which a group is not in equilibrium. Vertical dashed
lines separate blocks with different participation thresholds. Groups are ordered by
the total number of R choices in the entire experiment. Horizontal dashed lines show
the median split, groups with higher R levels being at the top.
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Overall, we find that lower action disclosure costs increase both the R levels and the
frequency of transitions to the efficient equilibrium. Since action disclosure costs should
have no effect if all players were myopic, these findings seem to indicate that some players
act strategically, a hypothesis that will be investigated in the next subsection.
3.2. Is Adaptation Explained by Belief Learning Models?
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Figure 3: R levels for groups in LOW that transition to an efficient equilibrium and groups in
HIGH that choose R most (three uppermost groups in figure 2 for each treatment).
Treatment differences in terms of R levels and transition frequency are mainly driven
by the adaptation process: figure 3 shows that groups which transition to the efficient
equilibrium in LOW (top three groups in the right panel of figure 2) and groups which are
most likely to choose R in HIGH (top three groups in the left panel of figure 2) exhibit
similar patterns of choices in block 1 and round 14, but all groups in LOW overcome
coordination failure while no group does so in HIGH. This subsection tests whether the
adaptation process can be explained by a learning model with or without sophistication:
we first test the predictions made by each model, then fit each model to the data and
compare the goodness of fit and finally we simulate the path of choices using the estimated
parameter values to test which model can most accurately predict whether a group will
overcome coordination failure.
3.2.1. Action Disclosure
A learning model with sophistication predicts that R will be disclosed more often than
S and more often in LOW than in HIGH (predictions S1 and S2). Figure 4 shows that
these predictions are mostly confirmed by the data. In the first round of block 2 all players
in LOW who choose R also disclose their actions, but only 40% do so in HIGH, a difference
that persists until all groups converge to an equilibrium in round 18. Actions are more
often disclosed at the start of a block than at the end; although this decrease is not the
main interest of this paper, we suspect that the rate of disclosure decreases either because
the lower number of remaining rounds decreases incentives for strategic teaching or because
13
strategic uncertainty decreases as players converge to an equilibrium, reducing the need
for disclosure.12
The difference between panel (a) and panel (b) of figure 4 indicates that S is disclosed
much less often than R in both treatments. Still, some players do disclose S in LOW, which
could be either a mistake, resulting from trivial disclosure costs, or a strategic decision,
especially as most of these disclosures are concentrated in rounds where most groups are
not in an equilibrium.
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(a) Disclosure conditional on choosing R
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
to
 d
isc
lo
se
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
Round
LOW treatment HIGH treatment
(b) Disclosure conditional on choosing S
Figure 4: Frequency of disclosure in LOW and HIGH treatments.
Result 3. R is disclosed more frequently than S. R is disclosed more frequently in LOW
than in HIGH.
Result 3 is supported by a probit regression of a disclosure decision on action choice
and treatment dummies (see table B.12 in Appendix B). The treatment effect is highly
significant if all data is taken into account or if we look only at disclosure conditional on
choosing R. Action R is disclosed significantly more often than S, and the rate of disclosure
decreases over time.
3.2.2. Belief Formation
The prediction that observing R increases both the beliefs about R choice and the likeli-
hood to choose R (prediction M1) can be tested on a group level and on an individual level.
On a group level, groups with higher initial observed R levels should overcome coordination
failure more often. Table 2 provides evidence in favour of this prediction: all groups in
which at least 4 players choose and disclose R in round 14 overcome coordination failure,
while all other groups do not. This difference cannot be explained by path dependence
12Figure 4 shows large fluctuations and missing data in HIGH after round 18, which are by a small
sample of disclosed actions.
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alone, as groups in which many players choose R but do not disclose their actions do not
overcome coordination failure (e.g. groups 4 and 11). Overall, the likelihood of a transition
depends on the level of observed R choices, and this feedback is lacking when disclosure
costs are high.
Table 2: The number of players in each group who chose R (“R levels”) and the number of
players who chose R and disclosed it in round 14 (“Disclosed R”). A transition is said
to occur if all group members chose R in the last round of block 2.
Treatment Group ID R levels Disclosed R Transition?
HIGH 3 2 0 No
HIGH 4 4 3 No
HIGH 9 1 0 No
HIGH 10 3 1 No
HIGH 11 4 2 No
HIGH 12 1 0 No
LOW 1 1 1 No
LOW 6 1 1 No
LOW 7 3 3 No
LOW 2 4 4 Yes
LOW 5 4 4 Yes
LOW 8 5 5 Yes
Result 4. Transitions to an efficient equilibrium are correlated with R levels a group ob-
served in round 14.
On an individual level, prediction M1 states that players who observe more R choices
should report higher beliefs. To test this prediction we regress stated beliefs on the level
of observed R and observed S in the previous two rounds. A correct specification must
take into account the fact that our units of observation are not independent: stated beliefs
might be correlated with the person’s stated beliefs in other rounds as well as with the
stated beliefs of other group members in the current round. Thus the most appropriate
specification should include an individual random effect nested within a group random
effect (three-level nested random effects model). Additionally, we estimate a standard two-
level model with only a group-specific random component. As an additional robustness
check we include a model with only one round lags.
Table 3 shows that observed R levels have a significant positive effect on beliefs about R
choice in the subsequent round. The actual R level is also significant, but the significance
level and the economic size are much lower than that of the observed R level. Observing
more players choosing S is not significant, suggesting that players who do not disclose their
actions are perceived in a similar way to those who choose S.
Models in table 3 treat observations from all rounds equally, therefore results are in-
fluenced by the correlation between choices and beliefs after play has converged to an
equilibrium, potentially overstating the effect of belief learning. We therefore replicate
the estimation using data only from rounds in which play has not yet converged, where
15
Table 3: Three-level nested random effects model and two-level random effects GLS model (12
clusters). Dependent variable: stated probability that a randomly chosen group mem-
ber chose R (from 0 to 100). Standard errors are robust to correlation within the
observations of each group.
Random effects GLS Nested random effects
Two-period lags One-period lags Two-period lags One-period lags
Observed R in (t-1) 11.20*** 11.58*** 10.47*** 10.83***
(12.90) (9.19) (9.36) (8.47)
Observed R in (t-2) 2.440** 1.829
(2.33) (1.57)
Observed S in (t-1) -2.940** -2.041 -3.639*** -3.191**
(-2.50) (-1.37) (-2.98) (-2.00)
Observed S in (t-2) 0.916 -0.0777
(1.01) (-0.07)
Actual R level in (t-1) 0.362 3.682*** 1.128 3.940***
(0.31) (3.84) (0.89) (4.50)
Actual R level in (t-2) 1.680** 1.836**
(1.98) (2.10)
Treatment: 1 = LOW -1.029 0.0160 0.189 1.116
0 = HIGH (-0.49) (0.01) (0.09) (0.54)
Constant 13.91*** 13.91*** 13.82*** 13.96***
(6.14) (6.77) (6.30) (6.86)
Observations 1944 2160 1944 2160
t statistics in parentheses
* p 0.10, ** p 0.05, *** p 0.01
convergence is said to occur if in the previous round all group members chose the same
action, either R or S. In this subset the effect of observed feedback on beliefs is lower, but
still highly significant (see table B.13 in Appendix B).
3.2.3. Estimation of a Weighted Fictitious Play Model
After establishing that beliefs are related to observed R levels, we can specify the adap-
tation process by fitting a belief learning model. We use a weighted fictitious play model
(Cheung and Friedman, 1997), modified to accommodate three features of the game. First,
we extended the original model specified for two player games to N -person games by as-
suming that a single belief biptq P r0, 1s is formed about the probability that any other
group member will choose R.13 We make this homogeneity assumption because aggregate
feedback prohibits forming and updating separate beliefs about the actions of each group
member (for a broader discussion and examples of use, see Rapoport, 1985, or Rapoport
and Eshed-Levy, 1989). Second, the option to not disclose one’s action results in incomplete
feedback, thus additional assumptions need to be made about how unobserved actions are
perceived. If beliefs were formed using Bayes rule, the interpretation of undisclosed actions
would depend on beliefs about the probability that R is disclosed, which is unknown to
13This specification of fictitious play assumes that players expect each group member to use a stationary
mixed strategy. In a game with two strategies prior belief about the probability to choose R follows a beta
distribution and is updated using Bayes rule.
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Table 4: Calculation of the weights assigned to previous experience.
Round 1 2 3    14 15    29 30   
(1) Fraction choosing R 0.6 0.2 0.4    0.6 0.8    0.4 0.6   
(2) Discount factor γt2 γt3 γt4    γt15 γt16    γt30 γt31   
(3) Forgetting factor β1β2 β1β2 β1β2    β2 β2    1 1   
the players. Instead of imposing Bayesian updating and correct beliefs we use a different
approach and add a new parameter (ρ) which specifies how an unobserved action is per-
ceived. In particular, if the number of other group members who did not disclose in round
t is denoted by #Uptq, the perceived R level would be calculated by #Rptq   ρ  #Uptq,
with ρ P r0, 1s.14 If ρ  1, unobserved actions are perceived as R. If ρ  0, unobserved
actions are perceived as S. The third feature is the change in the participation threshold
from one block to the next, which might mean that experience in one block is not directly
applicable to the next block. We therefore allow players to discount experience from a pre-
vious block by multiplying the observations from the first block by β1 and the observations
from the second block by β2. Putting everything together, we use the following formula to
determine the beliefs of player i about the likelihood that that any other group member
will choose R in round t, for all t ¡ 1:
biptq 
°t1
u1 γ
u1#Rptuq ρ#Uptuq
n1
Dpt uq°t1
u1 γ
u1Dpt uq
(1)
where Dpτq 
$'&
'%
β1  β2 if τ P r1, 13s
β2 if τ P r14, 28s
1 if τ P r29, 33s
Table 4 illustrates how the beliefs are formed. Row (1) shows a hypothetical sequence
of the observed fraction of other players choosing action R, including the correction for
unobserved actions, while rows (2) and (3) show weights assigned to each observation. At
each round beliefs are calculated by dividing the dot product of vectors (1), (2) and (3)
by the dot product of vectors (2) and (3). The discount factor assigns lower weight to the
history that occurred further back in time, because γ P r0, 1s. The forgetting factor reduces
the weight assigned to observations in previous blocks. For example, when a player is in the
third block (round 29 and above), observations from rounds 1–13 receive a weight of β1β2,
observations from rounds 14–28 receive a weight of β2 and observations for rounds above
29 receive a weight of 1. When a player is in the second block, all previous observations
are multiplied by β2, which cancels out, therefore observations from the first block receive
a weight of β1 and observations from the second block receive a weight of 1. For players in
14Equivalently, we could allow players to form three separate beliefs bRi ptq, b
S
i ptq and b
U
i ptq about the
observed number of R, S and U in a standard way, and calculate beliefs about the perceived number of R
as a convex combination of bRi ptq and b
U
i ptq.
17
the first block all observations are multiplied by β1β2, which cancels out, leaving a weight
of 1.
The model was fit by finding parameters γ, ρ, β1 and β2 that minimise the mean
squared deviation between biptq and the stated belief. The estimated coefficient values are
as follows: γˆ  0.43, ρˆ  0.15, βˆ1  0.28 and βˆ2  0.99. The low estimated value of ρ
shows that most players react to an unobserved action as if it was S rather than R. Adding
the β1 parameter improves the fit substantially, and the low estimate shows that history
in the first block has only a weak effect on choices in block 2. The estimated value of β2,
however, is close to 1, indicating that history in block 2 has a strong effect on beliefs in
round 3. Differences between the estimated values of β1 and β2 reflect an asymmetric effect
of changes in θ: a decrease allows some groups to move from the inefficient equilibrium to
the efficient one, but a subsequent increase does not lead back to the inefficient equilibrium.
We evaluate the fit of a belief learning model by comparing stated beliefs with fictitious
play beliefs, calculated using the estimated population level parameters and the actual
history of observed feedback. Figures A.5 and A.6 (in Appendix A) show that predicted
beliefs track stated beliefs rather well even on an individual level. Largest discrepancies
arise for players whose stated beliefs are not sensitive to observed history. Overall, both
the regressions and the estimation of a belief learning model indicate that stated beliefs
are affected by the observed history, as is predicted by a belief learning model.
Result 5. Players who observed larger R levels in previous rounds expect that others will
be more likely to choose R.
3.2.4. Response to Stated Beliefs
The previous subsection has shown that the evolution of beliefs can be predicted by a
weighted fictitious play model using feedback observed in the experiment. However, only
60% of players best-respond to their stated beliefs at the start of block 1 and block 2,
almost entirely because of choosing R when S would be optimal (see model 1 in figure
A.7). Here we will investigate whether utility functions of a different functional form could
explain choices better. In all specification we assume that decisions are based on expected
utilities:
EUpSq  up60q
EUpRq  up100q  Prp#R ¥ θq   up5q  p1 Prp#R ¥ θqq
where upq is the utility function, EUpSq and EUpRq are the expected utilities of actions S
and R and Prp#R ¥ θq is the subjective probability assigned to an event that the threshold
will be exceeded. To calculate this probability we use elicited probabilistic beliefs biptq and
construct a probability distribution over the number of group members who choose R.
In these calculations we assume that beliefs are homogeneous (Rapoport, 1985; Rapoport
and Eshed-Levy, 1989)15 and that players expect the actions of other group members to
15If separate beliefs were formed, the scoring rule is designed to elicit the expected value of all proba-
bilistic beliefs.
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be independently drawn from a binomial distribution with the stated probability. The
probability that the threshold will be exceeded is calculated as follows:
Prp#R ¥ θq 
n1¸
kθ1
pbiptqq
kp1 biptqq
n1k

n 1
k


How expected utilities are mapped into choices is determined by a choice rule. We compare
the predictions of the following choice rules:
1. Deterministic choice (DET ). The action with a higher expected utility is always
chosen, utility is equal to the monetary payoff.
2. Logistic choice (LOG). Utility is equal to the monetary payoff, but each action can
be chosen with positive probability, determined by a logistic choice rule:
PrpRq 
eλEUpRq
eλEUpRq   eλEUpSq
, with λ P r0,8q
3. Risk preferences (RISK ). In addition to a logistic choice rule, this specification
includes a utility function with constant relative risk aversion:
uppiiq 
pi1ri
1 r
4. Pro-social preferences (SOC ). In addition to their own payoff, subjects also take
into account the average earnings of other group members,and the strength of pro-
social preferences is captured by parameter α P r0, 1s:
uppii, piiq  p1 αqpii   α
¸
jPNztiu
pij
n 1
5. Farsightedness (FAR). This choice rule assumes that players take into account the
payoffs from hi upcoming rounds, where hi P r1,8q is the length of the planning
horizon.16 We assume that farsighted players expect all other group members to use
the DET choice rule, with beliefs formed using weighted fictitious play. The ability
to anticipate the reaction of others allows players to choose a best-response path to
the actions of other players in every future round. The expected utility of an action
is calculated by adding the expected utilities from all rounds along this best-response
path.
6. All preferences and farsightedness (ALL). This specification combines logistic
choice with farsightedness, risk and pro-social preferences.
16Players know the number of rounds in a given block, thus they cannot take into account the earn-
ings from rounds that will not be played. Therefore the actual number of rounds taken into account is
minthi, T  t  1u, where T is the number of rounds in a block and t is the current round.
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Table 5: Estimated parameter values and mean squared deviation (MSD) for each model.
Model
Parameter DET LOG RISK SOC FAR ALL
λˆ – 11.41 0.02 34.60 12.93 2.82
rˆ – – -1.85 – – -0.43
αˆ – – – 0.65 – 0
hˆ – – – – 6.75 3.60
MSD 242 197.88 181.31 183.83 181.31 180.25
Performance 0.00 71.45 98.28 94.20 98.28 100.00
(0 = worst, 100 = best)
We estimate the parameters of all six choice rules by minimizing the mean squared
deviation (MSD) between the predictions and experimental data. Table 5 shows the esti-
mated parameter values and the goodness of fit for each choice rule. Unsurprisingly, the
rule that combines all preferences and farsightedness fits data best, although specifications
with only risk preferences or farsightedness fit almost equally well with a lower number
of parameters. The estimated parameters of the ALL model indicate slight risk aversion,
farsightedness and no pro-social preferences. Figure A.7 in Appendix A compares predic-
tions with experimental data across rounds. All choice rules fit data well at the end of each
block, but models DET and LOG under-predict R choice following coordination failure in
LOW at the start of block 2 and all models under-predict R choice in LOW at the start
of block 3. Overall, deviations from a theoretical best-response could be explained either
by risk aversion, farsightedness or pro-social preferences.
Next we want to determine how well each choice rule can predict whether a group will
overcome coordination failure. We calculate beliefs in round 14 using estimated population-
level fictitious play parameters and observed feedback in rounds 1-13, averaged across all
players. Then we use each choice rule with weighted fictitious play to simulate the path of
choices in rounds 15-28 for each 6-person group. We run 1000 simulations for each model
and count the frequency of simulations in which coordination failure is overcome, which is
said to occur if in round 28 all group members hold beliefs under which R is a deterministic
best-response. Results of these simulations and experimental data are provided in table 6.
A model would predict data perfectly if 100% of simulations with groups #8, #2 and #5
would converge to an efficient equilibrium and 0% would do so for all other groups. No
model does as good, but most predict higher success rates for groups that actually overcome
coordination failure in the experiment. In particular, RISK and ALL stand out, with a
predicted gap of at least about 60 percentage points between the two clusters of groups.
SOC and FAR do somewhat less well as SOC under-predicts the success of groups that do
transition to the efficient equilibrium, while FAR over-predicts the success of groups that
do not transition. DET and LOG predict that almost no group will overcome coordination
failure, regardless of the choices in round 14.
Results of the simulations show that the correlation between final outcomes and initial
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Table 6: Frequency of transitions to the efficient equilibrium in simulations, compared to the
experiment. In simulations the percentage indicates the fraction of iterations in which R
is the deterministic best-response to beliefs in round 28. In the experiment a transition
occurs if all group members choose action R in round 28. Groups are sorted by observed
R levels in round 14.
Experiment Simulations
Group ID (R ^ D) in 14 Transition? DET LOG RISK SOC FAR ALL
8 5 Yes 0% 0.1% 100.0% 99.4% 91.3% 99.6%
2 4 Yes 0% 0% 81.3% 58.3% 88.3% 83.1%
5 4 Yes 0% 0% 84.9% 60.8% 87.6% 86.8%
4 3 No 0% 0% 26.8% 11.5% 48.7% 29.8%
7 3 No 0% 0% 17.3% 7.1% 37.6% 20.5%
11 2 No 0% 0% 0.9% 0.3% 2.8% 1.2%
1 1 No 0% 0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
6 1 No 0% 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
10 1 No 0% 0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2%
3 0 No 0% 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
9 0 No 0% 0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
12 0 No 0% 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
choices that is observed in our experiment can be well explained by belief learning models
with risk preferences, social preferences or farsightedness. This is, of course, not the only
possible explanation, and we review other possibilities in Appendix C. In short, we look
at possibilities that players in the two treatments have different personal characteristics,
experience different histories in block 1, or that the adaptation process is driven by rein-
forcement learning or reciprocity. Each of these explanations could potentially explain the
treatment difference, but we show that none of them can fully explain experimental data.
3.3. Individual Heterogeneity in LOW
In HIGH all groups converge to an inefficient equilibrium, but in LOW there is het-
erogeneity, which is explored in this section. In particular, we have shown that whether a
group in LOW overcomes coordination failure depends on the number of group members
who choose R and disclose it in round 14 (result 4). We will therefore test whether R is
more often chosen by players who are more risk seeking, pro-social or farsighted, as pre-
dicted by the theory (see Appendix F). Before showing the results, we will explain the tasks
that we used in the lab to measure each of these characteristics. Each task was incentivised
and these earnings were added to the earnings from the main part of the experiment.
3.3.1. Elicitation of Risk and Social Preferences
Risk preferences were elicited using a multiple price list (Holt and Laury, 2002), and
the number of safe choices was used as a measure of risk aversion.17 Note that objective
risk was not present in the experiment and uncertainty about payoffs originated only from
175 subjects switched more than once, therefore results are slightly different if risk aversion is measured
using the first switching round. In such case the coefficient of risk aversion decreases and becomes less
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strategic uncertainty. But if players form probabilistic beliefs, a utility function with a
lower Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion would make R myopically optimal for a wider
range of beliefs (see Appendix F.3 for a proof).
Social preferences were elicited using a Social Value Orientation (SVO) Slider Measure
(Murphy et al., 2011), following a z-Tree implementation by Crosetto et al. (2012). In
this measure subjects complete six allocation tasks18 between themselves and some other
participant, who was randomly selected from a different group to prevent meeting former
group members. A graphical representation of all tasks is shown in figure G.8, Appendix G.
At the end of the experiment one task was chosen for payment and subjects received either
the amount that they sent or the amount that was sent to them by the other participant.
Answers to each task were used to construct a continuous, uni-dimensional scale of SVO,
known as the SVO angle, using the following formula:
SVO angle  arctan
°
tPt1,..,6upP
O
t  50q°
tPt1,..,6upP
S
t  50q

where P St is the amount allocated to oneself in task t and P
O
t is the amount allocated to
the other person. SVO angle ranges from -16.26 for perfectly competitive individuals to
61.39 for perfectly altruistic individuals.
3.3.2. Elicitation of Farsightedness
Players who deviate from an inefficient equilibrium for strategic reasons must be able
to reason about future events and take future payoffs into consideration. Prediction S4
states that farsighted players, i.e. those with a longer planning horizon, should be more
likely to initiate a transition. To test this prediction we measured the ability to plan
ahead in a task where farsighted and myopic players would behave differently. We could
have used a strategic game such as a centipede game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) or a
race game (Gneezy et al., 2010), in which choices of farsighted players should be closer to
the predictions of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. However, in such games choices
may differ from theoretical predictions for reasons other than the lack of farsightedness:
for example, subjects may be pro-social or doubt the rationality of others. To overcome
these potential problems we used an individual choice task from Bone et al. (2009), in
which subjects had to anticipate their own future choices. Since no other participants are
involved in the task, choices should not be affected by distributional concerns or beliefs
about rationality, so we are more confident that it is the ability to plan ahead that is being
measured.
The task was presented as a decision tree with two decision nodes and two chance nodes
(see figures I.14 - I.16 in Appendix I). In the second decision node one move dominates the
significant in models 5 and 6 in table 9. The coefficient of farsightedness turns significant at a 10% level
in model 3 in table 9.
18We added a seventh task, completed after the six original ones. This task tested whether subjects
were willing to give up their earnings to reduce the level of advantageous inequality (see footnote 10). This
additional task was not used to calculate the SVO angle.
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other, making it trivial to choose correctly (97% of players chose the dominant move, both
in Bone et al., 2009, and in our experiment). In the first node one decision also dominates
the other, but only if subjects anticipate their own choices in the second node. Payoffs
were set up such that players who ignore the payoffs that will not be reached would choose
one move (we call it “correct move” as it would maximise payoffs for 97% of the players)
while those who treat the second decision node as a chance node, expecting all final payoffs
to be equally likely, would choose a different move.
To classify subjects more precisely we designed three tasks with different difficulty
levels,19 which increased the frequency of correct moves from 21% in the hard task to 42%
in the intermediate task and 65% in the easy task. Each subject completed all three tasks
in the order of decreasing difficulty and one task was randomly chosen for payment. 88%
of subjects chose the correct move in an easier task if they had chosen the correct move
in a more difficult task, conforming with the Guttman scale (Guttman, 1950). To more
accurately classify subjects who did not conform with the Guttman scale, the farsightedness
score was calculated the following way:
• Score of 0 for players who failed in the easy task
• Score of 1 for players who solved the easy task but failed in the intermediate task
• Score of 2 for players who solved the easy and intermediate tasks but failed in the
hard task
• Score of 3 for players who solved all three tasks
Alternatively, we could evaluate farsightedness by looking at the process underlying
choices in dynamic settings. Supplementing choice data by procedural variables improves
the precision of the classification procedure, and there has been an increasing use of data
on eye movements (Arieli et al., 2011; Polonio et al., 2015), information search (Costa-
Gomes et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2002) and response times (Rubinstein, 2007; Piovesan
and Wengstro¨m, 2009, review in Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2015). In this study we use
response times, creating a measure of the willingness to think ahead (in node 1) rather than
afterwards (in node 2). Specifically, we calculate the ratio of time spent in the first node
relative to the second node. Farsighted players should have a higher time ratio because
to maximize payoffs they need to choose a decision for each possible second node prior to
19We manipulated the task difficulty by changing payoff differences. Two types of payoff differences are
present in each task: the actual difference in expected payoffs in favour of the correct move if the second
node decision was taken into account (“farsighted payoff difference”), and the difference in the average
of all payoffs in favour of the incorrect move if all payoffs were treated as being equally likely (“myopic
payoff difference”). “Hard task” was adapted from Bone et al. (2009), with a farsighted payoff difference of
125 ECU and the myopic payoff difference of 138 ECU. “Intermediate task” made the correct choice more
attractive by increasing the farsighted payoff difference to 175 ECU and at the same time reducing the
myopic payoff difference to 125 ECU. In the ”easy task” the distribution of payoffs was the same for both
actions, reducing the myopic payoff difference to 0, but the payoffs were arranged in a way that increased
the farsighted payoff difference to 300 ECU.
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making a decision in the first node. Myopic players would have a lower time ratio because
the would make second node decisions only once the second node has been reached.
The farsightedness measure based on response times has several advantages over the
measure based on correct answers. The time ratio is a continuous variable, therefore
subjects can be classified more accurately. The number of correct answers may also be
confounded by other traits, such as intelligence, while response times capture the willing-
ness to think ahead, regardless of the success of such efforts. It reassuring to know that
both measures are closely related: participants who solve more tasks correctly on average
spend more time in the first decision node (table 7). We can therefore be more confident
that it is the farsightedness that is being measured.
Table 7: Comparison of two measures used to measure farsightedness: farsightedness score is
based on the number of correct answers, time ratio is calculated as the ratio of time
spent in node 1 relative to time spent in node 2.
Farsightedness score Average time ratio N
0 1.20 25
1 1.35 21
2 1.91 18
3 2.50 8
Total 1.57 72
3.3.3. Results: Personal Characteristics and R Choice in LOW
We identify the types of players who are more likely to choose R by comparing the
characteristics of subjects who choose R and then running a probit regression with four
specifications. In the first two specifications the dependent variable is set to 1 for players
who chose R and disclosed it in round 14 and is set to 0 otherwise. We favour this
specification because observed R levels in round 14 accurately predict transition success,
but it suffers from a problem of independence, as observations in round 14 are affected
by the shared history in block 1. To account for the different histories we add the total
number of observed R and S in block 1 as control variables. Furthermore, we replicate
the analysis in models 3 and 4 using choices from round 1, which are independent. The
difference between model 1 and 2 and between model 3 and 4 lies in the measurement of
farsightedness: farsighted score is based on the number of correctly solved individual choice
tasks, while time ratio measures time spent in the first decision node relative to time spent
in the second decision node.
Both the average scores in table 8 and the probit regressions in table 9 show that
players who are more farsighted and who report higher beliefs are more likely to choose R
in rounds 1 and 14. Table 8 shows a large difference in the magnitude of farsightedness
between players who choose R and S, although Mann-Whitney U test fails to reject the null
hypothesis when the farsightedness score is used. Table 9 reports the marginal effects at
the means of covariates for the four probit models. Farsightedness is positively related to
24
Table 8: Average scores of subjects who choose R and S in rounds 1 and 14, LOW treatment.
Significance levels reflect p-values for the test that characteristics of subjects choosing
S and R in the corresponding round are drawn from the same distribution (Mann-
Whitney U test).
Round 1 Round 14
S R S R
Farsightedness: score 0.75 1.25 0.78 1.28
Farsightedness: time ratio 1.53 1.69 1.34* 1.89*
Risk aversion 6.38 5.60 6.06 5.83
Pro-social attitudes 20.75 24.52 23.34 22.35
Beliefs 30.75*** 66.80*** 35.44** 52.67**
Average income 63.54 67.99 62.68 69.35
N 16.00 20.00 18.00 18.00
* p 0.10, ** p 0.05, *** p 0.01
Table 9: Probit models, dependent variable: choose R and disclose (1-4), choose R (5-6). Con-
trols for gender and age. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
Round 14 Round 1
Dependent variable Choose R and disclose Choose R and disclose Choose R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Farsighted score 0.153* 0.147 0.119
(1.67) (1.62) (1.17)
Time ratio 0.289*** 0.249*** 0.107
(3.08) (2.86) (0.88)
Risk aversion -0.00779 -0.0233 -0.0835 -0.0838 -0.274** -0.308**
(-0.12) (-0.34) (-1.24) (-1.13) (-2.24) (-2.28)
Pro-social attitudes 0.00279 0.00334 0.0106 0.0104 0.0210** 0.0220**
(0.46) (0.55) (1.28) (1.29) (2.16) (2.23)
Beliefs 0.00673 0.0117** 0.0104*** 0.0120*** 0.0191*** 0.0204***
(1.46) (2.36) (3.38) (3.85) (3.54) (3.28)
Observed R 0.0448 0.0437
(1.40) (1.40)
Observed S -0.0373 -0.0567
(-0.90) (-1.34)
Constant
N 36 36 36 36 36 36
pseudo R2 0.174 0.264 0.300 0.355 0.508 0.495
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p 0.10, ** p 0.05, *** p 0.01
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the tendency to choose R and disclose, and the significance level depends on the dependent
variable and on the method used to measure farsightedness (p-values range from 0.002 to
0.131). In addition to statistical significance, we find a large economic effect: the predicted
likelihood to choose R and disclose in round 14 is 30% for subjects with a farsightedness
score of 0 and increases to 81% for those with a score of 3, holding other factors constant
at their mean (Wald test shows that the difference is statistically significant, p-value =
0.0324). The difference between subjects with a score of 0 and those with scores 1 or 2 is
of expected sign, but not significant at the 5% level. The ratio of decision times predicts
choices better than the number of correct answers, as is evident from higher significance
levels and a higher pseudo-R2. The coefficient of stated beliefs is statistically significant in
all specifications except for model 1.
The estimated coefficients for risk aversion and pro-social attitudes are of expected
sign, but not statistically significant. But a player who chooses R because of pro-social or
risk-loving preferences might not be willing to pay even a trivial amount to disclose the
action, thus it would be more appropriate to evaluate the effect of these motives using
an unconditional decision to choose R. In round 14 all players who choose R also disclose
this action, therefore the estimated coefficients would be identical to models 1 and 2 in
table 9. In round 1, however, 30% of participants who choose R do not disclose this
action. When we use an unconditional decision to choose R in round 1 as a dependent
variable, risk aversion and pro-social preferences become significant, while the coefficients
for farsightedness decrease and become insignificant (columns 5 and 6 in table 9). Thus
it seems that players driven by pro-social or risk-seeking preferences choose R in round 1,
but they do not necessarily disclose their actions, while farsighted players are more likely
to choose R and disclose both in round 1 and in round 14.
Result 6. Participants in LOW who are classified as more farsighted are significantly more
likely to choose R and disclose this action in rounds 1 and 14. Risk-loving and pro-social
participants are more likely to choose R in round 1.
4. Discussion: Role of Strategic Motives
One of the goals of this paper is to investigate whether deviations from an inefficient
convention could be explained by strategic motives. This section will briefly review our
main findings, which are mostly consistent with the strategic hypothesis.
We find that many players are willing to pay to make their actions observable, and
those who choose R are much more likely to do so (result 3). Strategic motives seem
to be the most likely explanation for these findings because action disclosure provides no
monetary benefits in the current round. If disclosures were motivated by non-strategic
motives, the frequency of disclosure should not decrease over time and it would be hard to
explain why less than 20% of players disclose their actions at the end of block 2 when it
costs 2 ECU while 40% disclose at the start of block 2 when it costs 80 ECU (see figure 4).
Some disclosures might be a result of mistakes, but a large gap between disclosures of R
and S and the concentration of disclosures at the start of each block indicate a systematic
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pattern rather than random errors. We also find that R levels and disclosures of R are
higher and transitions to the efficient equilibrium are more frequent in LOW (result 1 and
result 2), just as predicted by the learning model with sophistication. Evidence for belief
learning (result 5) and a strong correlation between observed R levels in round 14 and
revolt success (result 4) provides further support that choosing R following coordination
on S could be a part of a payoff-maximizing strategy if future earnings are taken into
account. In fact, players in LOW who choose R and disclose it in round 14 on average
earn 69 ECU per round, compared to 63 ECU earned by other players. In HIGH, however,
strategic teaching is not profitable: those who choose R and disclose on average make
only 42 ECU, compared to 54 ECU made by others. Finally, we find that in the low cost
treatment players with a longer planning horizon are more likely to choose R and disclose
this action, while risk-seeking and and pro-social preferences have a significant effect only
on the R choices in the first round (result 6).
However, even as players seem to understand the benefits of having their actions ob-
served, there are indications that the ability to make inter-temporal trade-offs is limited.
First, higher action disclosure costs discourage action disclosure, but have only a small
direct effect on R levels in round 14. A sophisticated player would be expected to compare
the payoffs of choosing R and disclosing with the payoffs of choosing S and not disclosing,
and choose R if the former is larger than the latter. Consequently, higher costs should
reduce not only the tendency to disclose, but also the tendency to choose R. Yet we find
that in round 14 higher costs discourage only action disclosure, but not the tendency to
choose R. Thus low disclosure costs help overcome coordination failure mostly through
higher observed R levels that alter beliefs and therefore choices in subsequent rounds. The
second issue is that at the start of the second block 25% of players in HIGH choose R and
do not disclose their actions. It may seem that sophisticated players should either choose
R and disclose, or choose S and not disclose. One explanation for choosing R and not
disclosing could be that such choices are driven by non-strategic motives, such as beliefs
or preferences. But sophisticated players could also choose R without disclosing even if R
was not myopically optimal, as long as a sufficiently large probability is assigned to the
event that exactly θ1 other group members will choose R. In such an event one’s decision
would be pivotal, and a choice of R would raise R levels above the threshold, informing
other players about the true R levels via their payoffs.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper addresses the social dilemma of inefficient conventions: a unilateral deviation
from an inefficient convention is costly, even though a collective deviation would lead
to a Pareto improvement. We are interested in how this improvement can be achieved:
what features of the environment facilitate the diffusion of efficient conventions and what
motivates individuals to deviate? We address these questions using a laboratory experiment
that tests whether deviations from an inefficient convention are explained by strategic
motives and whether such deviations occur more often when players can disclose their
actions at a lower cost. We find support for the hypothesis that deviation are motivated
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by strategic reasons and we also find that inefficient conventions are overcome only if action
disclosure costs are low.
The problem that motivated the design of our experiment was the failure to take po-
litical action, and our findings suggest several ways of how this problem could be solved.
Availability of information technology could make it easier to inform others about one’s
action both directly, through social media, and indirectly, through the information shared
by other parties. The physical location of events might matter too, as a large central space
should make it easier to gauge the level of support, while also allowing the information to
be shared more rapidly between the participants. However, before implementing any such
interventions more research has to be done to verify the external validity of our findings and
to understand the potential negative effects. For example, advances in information technol-
ogy could crowd out physical protests or make it easier for the regime to use propaganda,
censorship or surveillance (Morozov, 2012).
Our findings could also be applied to other settings with persistent inefficient conven-
tions. An inefficient technology could become the standard if it exhibits steep returns to
scale (Arthur, 1989): examples of such technological lock-in include QWERTY keyboard
(David, 1985), inferior information technology (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) or light water
nuclear reactors (Cowan, 1990). As older technologies are constantly being superseded by
new innovations, explicit regulation of standards becomes too costly; instead, it would be
desirable to design a decentralised system that would facilitate the diffusion of the most
efficient technology. Designing the environment in the right way could also help overcome
coordination failures that occur when groups adopt inefficient social customs (Akerlof,
1980) or when societies end up with inefficient economic and political institutions (North,
1990; Acemoglu, 2006).
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Figure A.5: Comparison of stated beliefs and estimated beliefs using a weighted fictitious play
model with parameters that minimise MSD. Graphs by subject, HIGH treatment.
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Figure A.6: Comparison of stated beliefs and estimated beliefs using a weighted fictitious play
model with parameters that minimise MSD. Graphs by subject, LOW treatment.
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Model 1: Deterministic best-response
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Model 2: Logit best-response
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Model 3: Risk preferences
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Model 4: Pro-social preferences
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Model 5: Farsightedness
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Figure A.7: Comparison of empirical R levels and R levels predicted by each of the six choice
rules.
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Appendix B. Tables
Table B.10: Estimated treatment effect by round, calculated using the estimates of a multilevel
GLS random effects regression and group level data. Standard errors clustered on
group level.
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Coefficient 0.170 0.161 0.152 0.143 0.134 0.125 0.115 0.106 0.097 0.088 0.079 0.070 0.060 1.429 1.573 1.716
p-value 0.782 0.773 0.761 0.748 0.732 0.713 0.691 0.668 0.652 0.655 0.689 0.747 0.807 0.228 0.183 0.146
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
1.860 2.003 2.146 2.290 2.433 2.577 2.720 2.864 3.007 3.151 3.294 3.438 2.900 2.900 2.900 2.900 2.900
0.116 0.092 0.073 0.058 0.047 0.038 0.031 0.026 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.024 0.028
Table B.11: Time trends: estimated p-values for the coefficient of the number of rounds left.
Block HIGH treatment LOW treatment
1 0.0001 0.0000
2 0.0037 0.7351
3 0.0059 0.0410
Table B.12: Random-effects panel data probit regression (12 clusters). Dependent variable is
equal to 1 if the action is disclosed.
All data Decisions after choosing R
Treatment = LOW 1.128*** 1.227***
(5.25) (3.33)
Action = R 1.742***
(15.48)
Round -0.0517*** -0.0554***
(-9.55) (-7.63)
Constant -2.011*** -0.192
(-10.65) (-0.70)
Observations 2376 545
t statistics in parentheses
* p 0.10, ** p 0.05, *** p 0.01
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Table B.13: Three-level nested random effects model and two-level random effects GLS model
(12 clusters). Dependent variable: stated probability that a randomly chosen group
member chose R (from 0 to 100). Standard errors are robust to correlation within
the observations of each group. Observations from rounds in which groups are
converged to an equilibrium are dropped (a group is converged if no player observed
two different actions being chosen in the previous round)
Random effects GLS Nested random effects
Two-period lags One-period lags Two-period lags One-period lags
Observed R in (t-1) 6.723*** 6.815*** 7.074*** 7.051***
(4.96) (3.97) (6.13) (3.87)
Observed R in (t-2) 0.772 1.447
(0.36) (0.66)
Observed S in (t-1) -3.950* -3.019 -4.591** -3.577*
(-1.87) (-1.36) (-2.40) (-1.91)
Observed S in (t-2) 1.110 1.083
(0.36) (0.36)
Actual R level in (t-1) 5.120** 6.680*** 4.767*** 6.508***
(2.40) (5.67) (3.37) (6.52)
Actual R level in (t-2) 1.857 1.231
(0.64) (0.48)
Treatment: 1 = LOW -6.596* -1.813 -6.148* -1.633
0 = HIGH (-1.66) (-0.44) (-1.89) (-0.40)
Constant 17.51*** 16.03*** 17.51*** 16.09***
(3.03) (3.22) (3.44) (3.37)
Observations 192 270 192 270
t statistics in parentheses
* p 0.10, ** p 0.05, *** p 0.01
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Appendix C. Alternative Explanations for the Treatment Difference
Treatment Farsightedness score Risk preference SVO angle Female Age
High 1.22 5.92 16.85 0.58 21.06
Low 1.03 5.94 22.85 0.47 20.97
Range 0–3 2–10 -7.82 – 53.37 0–1 18–29
Table C.14: Descriptive statistics and their range by treatment
First, participants in the two treatments could differ in terms of their personal char-
acteristics, which would lead to different responses to beliefs. To evaluate this possibility
we compare the levels of farsightedness, risk and social preferences and demographic data,
which were elicited at the end of the experiment (see section 3.3.1 for details). Table C.14
shows that most characteristics are similar, except for the SVO angle that measures pro-
social preferences: subjects in LOW are more pro-social and the difference is marginally
significant (Mann-Whitney U test p-value = 0.0615). If more pro-social participants were
assigned to LOW, this difference could potentially explain the treatment effect because
pro-social players should be more likely to choose R (see Appendix F.4). However, differ-
ences in social preferences should increase R levels in all rounds, while we find that the
treatment difference is very small at the start of block 2, but grows over time. Alternatively,
choices in the SVO task could have been influenced by outcomes in the main part of the
experiment. Social preference elicitation task was conducted at the end of the experiment
and subjects from groups that coordinated on the efficient equilibrium might have acted
in a more pro-social way, for motives such as reciprocity. Note that differences in social
preferences cannot be explained by direct reciprocity, as subjects were never matched with
their group members from the main part of the experiment, but they might be explained
by generalised reciprocity (see Stanca, 2009, for evidence of generalised reciprocity).
Second, the process that drives the treatment difference could be reinforcement learning
instead of belief learning. If this was the case, separate attractions could be formed for
each of the four strategies in a stage game: ‘choose R and disclose it’ (R, D), ‘choose R and
not disclose’ (R, ND), ‘choose S and disclose’ (S, D) and ‘choose S and not disclose’ (S,
ND). If at the start of block 2 there are no treatment differences between the frequencies
with which each strategy is chosen, payoffs to players who chose (R, D) will be lower
in HIGH than in LOW. Under reinforcement learning the attraction of (R, D) would be
reduced more strongly in HIGH than in LOW. If few players choose (S, D), this would
reduce R levels in HIGH more than in LOW. However, there is no evidence that large
losses discourage subsequent R choice in HIGH at the start of block 2: players who choose
(R, D) in round 14 make -75 ECU in that round, yet 83% of them continue choosing R in
round 15; in comparison, those who choose (R, ND) earn 4 ECU, but only 22% of them
choose R in round 15.
Another process that could explain the correlation between observed feedback and
choices without the need to form beliefs is reciprocity: players who observe many group
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members choosing R could receive higher payoffs and they would be willing to reciprocate
by choosing R more often in subsequent rounds. However, this explanation seems unlikely
for several reasons. First, subjects are always informed about their payoffs, so observed R
levels provide no additional information about one’s earnings. Thus reciprocity should be
induced by the actual R levels rather than the observed R levels. Second, R levels would
affect earnings only if the participation threshold has been exceeded, and therefore there
should be no difference in responses to higher observed R levels as long as the threshold
has not been exceeded. Instead, we find that the effect of observed R levels is continuous:
observing one additional group member choosing R has a positive effect, regardless of the
R levels.20 Third, reciprocity should be driven by subjects who chose R in the previous
round because the payoffs of those who chose S are always fixed. In the probit regression we
include a variable capturing the interaction between choosing R in the previous round and
the observed R levels and find that the estimated coefficient is small and not significant (p
= 0.973), suggesting that those who chose R and those who chose S are similarly affected
by the observed history.
20p-values for the different numbers of observed R are: 0.008 (1 vs 0), 0.150 (2 vs 1), 0.068 (3 vs 2),
0.825 (4 vs 3), 0.000 (5 vs 4)
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Appendix D. Belief Elicitation Task
The belief elicitation task was designed to elicit precise and truthful probabilistic beliefs
about the actions of other players. Images of the computer screen seen by the participants
are reproduced in figures I.12 and I.13. Instructions are reproduced in Appendix H.
To get a precise measure of beliefs we allowed subjects to choose any number between
0% to 100%, but elicitation was performed in two stages. The first stage displayed only
the outcomes for all multiples of 5 between 0 and 100, and the second stage displayed the
outcomes for the 11 strategies closest to the one chosen in the first stage.
To avoid hedging within one round, subjects were paid either their accumulated earn-
ings from 33 rounds of the main part of the experiment, or they were paid for the belief
elicitation tasks. In particular, at the end of the experiment a random draw was performed,
so that with 80% probability a subject was paid for the main part of the experiment and
with 20% probability for the belief elicitation task (Blanco et al., 2010, used a similar
procedure to avoid hedging). The chances to be paid for the belief elicitation task were
deliberately kept low to further reduce the temptation to hedge. We used a random-lottery
incentive scheme by choosing one round for payment at the end of the experiment, a pro-
cedure that has been shown to avoid the income effect that appears if earnings are added
up (Lee, 2008).
The second issue that may hinder the elicitation of truthful beliefs is risk preference: for
example, risk-averse subjects may avoid reporting beliefs that are too extreme to lower the
risk of receiving a low payment. It has been shown that deterministic payment schemes,
such as the quadratic scoring rule (McKelvey and Page, 1990; Nyarko and Schotter, 2002),
do not elicit truthful beliefs if subjects are not risk neutral (Schlag and van der Weele,
2013). Therefore we used a binarized scoring rule, which should elicit truthful beliefs
irrespective of risk attitudes (Schlag and van der Weele, 2013). Experiments have also
shown that a binarized scoring rule is less influenced by risk attitudes and is closer to
the objective probabilities compared to the quadratic scoring rule (Hossain and Okui,
2013). The binarized scoring rule was implemented by paying subjects in lottery tickets
instead of monetary earnings. If the belief elicitation task was chosen for payment, subjects
participated in a lottery that yielded either 4000 ECU or 1000 ECU. Better performance
in the belief elicitation task therefore did not affect the size of the earnings, but increased
the chances to receive the higher reward.
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Appendix E. Choice Rule for Models with Farsightedness
In this appendix we will explain how we calculate the utility for a farsighted player,
used in models FAR and ALL. We assume that a farsighted player i is maximizing the
sum of earnings over the time period hi, which we will refer to as a “planning horizon”.
We treat the planning horizon as a personal characteristic, to be estimated from the data.
Of course, the planning horizon cannot be longer than the number of periods that are
remaining (which was known in the experiment), thus players add up the earnings from
minthi, T  t  1u periods, where T is the length of the game and t is the current period.
Just as in other choice rules, farsighted players hold a probabilistic belief about the
actions of other players in the current period. A player with a planning horizon equal to
1 would therefore myopically respond this belief. Players with a longer planning horizon
must also form beliefs about the choices that others will take in future periods. We assume
that farsighted players expect that all others are myopic: they form beliefs according to
weighted fictitious play and choose an immediate best-reply, under standard preferences
(as in model DET ). To calculate the path of choices of myopic players one would typically
need to make assumptions about the way that myopic players are learning (value of γ),
but in the game used in this paper all the results will hold regardless of the parameters of
the fictitious play learning model.
The precise way how these paths are calculated is shown in tables E.15 and E.16. Table
E.15 shows the path of choices when θ  6. In this case action R is the best-response only
for players who hold a belief of at least 0.9, therefore in period t   1 action R would be
chosen only by those who observed all other players choosing R in period t. Consequently,
the inefficient convention is overcome only if player i and all myopic players choose R
in period t. If the sophisticated player chooses R and 4 myopic players choose S, there
will be one myopic player who will have observed all others choosing R, and who would
subsequently choose R in period t  1. But this player would not observe anyone choosing
R in round t   1 and hence all players would choose S from period t   2 onwards. In all
other cases all myopic players would be choosing S from period t  1 onwards.
Table E.16 shows the path of choices when θ  5. With this threshold value action R
is the myopic best-response if a player holds a belief of at least 0.72, thus in period t   1
action R would be chosen only by those who observed at least 4 out of 5 others choosing
R. If in period t player i chooses R, and so do 4 or 5 myopic players, all players end up
playing R in period t  1, as well as in all subsequent periods. The same happens if player
i chooses S and all myopic players choose R. But if the number of players who choose R in
period t is 4 or less, the group always converges to an inefficient equilibrium, because only
the myopic players who chose S in period t observe 4 others choosing R. This results in 1 or
2 myopic players choosing R, and would lead all myopic players to choose R in period t 2,
regardless of the value of γ. In all other cases, when the total number of players choosing
R in period t is 3 or less, all myopic players choose S in period t   1 and all subsequent
periods.
Since player i anticipates the choices of other players, he will choose the action for
period t   1 and all later periods in a way that maximizes the sum of payoffs from the
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game. Information about the actions presented in tables E.15 and E.16 can be used to
compute the earnings for all players: round payoffs are equal to 60 when S is chosen, 100
when R is chosen and the threshold has been exceeded and 5 when R is chosen and the
threshold has not been exceeded. Choosing R in round t becomes more attractive to player
i as he puts higher probability on the event that 5 others will choose R in the case θ  6
or on the event that 4 others will choose R in the case θ  5, as in these two cases i’s
decision will determine which equilibrium play will converge to.
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Table E.15: Each table represents a choice path for every possible action profile in period t.
This table shows the case when θ  6.
Actions
Period Player i Other players #R ¥ θ?
t R R R R R R Yes
¥ t  1 R R R R R R Yes
t R R R R R S No
t  1 S S S S S R No
¥ t  2 S S S S S S No
t R R R R S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t R R R S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t R R S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t R S S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
Actions
Period Player i Other players #R ¥ θ?
t S R R R R R No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S R R R R S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S R R R S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S R R S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S R S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S S S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
Table E.16: Each table represents a choice path for every possible action profile in period t.
This table shows the case when θ  5.
Actions
Period Player i Other players #R ¥ θ?
t R R R R R R Yes
¥ t  1 R R R R R R Yes
t R R R R R S Yes
¥ t  1 R R R R R R Yes
t R R R R S S No
t  1 S S S S R R No
¥ t  2 S S S S S S No
t R R R S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t R R S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t R S S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
Actions
Period Player i Other players #R ¥ θ?
t S R R R R R Yes
¥ t  1 R R R R R R Yes
t S R R R R S No
t  1 S S S S S R No
¥ t  2 S S S S S S No
t S R R R S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S R R S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S R S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
t S S S S S S No
¥ t  1 S S S S S S No
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Appendix F. Risk and Social Preferences
Appendix F.1. Preliminaries
Assume that player i P N chooses action ai P t1, 0u where ai  1 if R is chosen and
ai  0 if S is chosen. Define the action profile of all players except for i by a vector
ai  jPNztiuaj. The total number of players other than i who chose action R can be
calculated using a dot product: #R  ai  ai. The vector of profits for all players can
be expressed as a function of the action taken by player i and of the total number of other
players who choose R:
Πpai,#Rq 
$'''&
'''%
t100, 100  1#R, 60  1n#R1u if #R   ai ¥ θ and ai  1
t60 , 100  1#R, 60  1n#R1u if #R   ai ¥ θ and ai  0
t5 , 5  1#R, 60  1n#R1u if #R   ai   θ and ai  1
t60 , 5  1#R, 60  1n#R1u if #R   ai   θ and ai  0
where 1x is a vector of ones of length x. The first entry in the profit vector specifies the
profit to player i, the second entry specifies the profits to #R players who chose R and the
third entry specifies the profits for the n#R 1 players who chose S. Define the payoff
to player i as Πipai,#Rq and the payoff vector of other players as Πipai,#Rq.
Define subjective beliefs about the number of other group members who will choose R
by a probability mass function σp#Rq : t0, 1, . . . , n 1u Ñ r0, 1s.
The expected utility of action ai, conditional on subjective beliefs σ, is:
EUpai, σq 
¸
bPt0,...,n1u
σpbqupΠpai, bqq
Action R maximizes expected utility if a function that measures the difference between
expected utilities is positive:
dpσ, uq  EUpR, σq  EUpS, σq 
¸
bPt0,...,n1u
σpbqpupR, bq  upS, bqq ¥ 0 (F.1)
Appendix F.2. Risk Neutral, Self-interested Players
Self interested players would take into account only their own payoffs, specified by the
first entry of a payoff vector Πpai,#Rq:
Πipai,#Rq 
$'&
'%
100 if ai  1 and #R ¥ θ  1
5 if ai  1 and #R   θ  1
60 if ai  0
(F.2)
For risk neutral players utility is equal to payoffs: upΠipai,#Rqq  Πipai,#Rq.
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Substitute (F.2) into (F.1) and define Prp#R ¥ θ  1q 
°n
bθ1 σpbq to get:
dpσ, uq ¥ 0 ô
Prp#R ¥ θ  1q  40  p1 Prp#R ¥ θ  1qq  p55q ¥ 0 ô
Prp#R ¥ θ  1q ¥
11
19
(F.3)
A risk neutral player will choose R if and only if he assigns a probability of at least 11
19
to the event that the participation threshold will be exceeded.
Appendix F.3. Risk Attitudes
Now suppose that players are not necessarily risk neutral. Define vpxq satisfying v1pxq ¡
0 as the utility of receiving x, and use (F.2) to calculate utility:
upai,#Rq 
$'&
'%
vp100q if ai  1 and #R ¥ θ  1
vp5q if ai  1 and #R   θ  1
vp60q if ai  0
(F.4)
Note that if σpq is degenerate, there is no strategic uncertainty and thus the strict
monotonicity of vpq ensures that the shape of the utility function will not affect the optimal
choice. If σpq is not degenerate and Prp#R ¡ θ 1q P p0, 1q, R will be the optimal action
if:
dpσ, uq ¥ 0 ô
Prp#R ¥ θ  1q  pvp100q  vp60qq   p1 Prp#R ¥ θ  1qq  pvp5q  vp60qq ¥ 0 ô
Prp#R ¥ θ  1q
1 Prp#R ¥ θ  1q
vp100q  vp60q
vp60q  vp5q
¥ 0 (F.5)
Consider two utility functions, v1pxq and v2pxq such that v1 exhibits higher risk aversion
v21pxq
v11pxq
¡
v22pxq
v12pxq
	
. Then v1p100qv1p60q
v1p60qv1p5q
  v2p100qv2p60q
v2p60qv2p5q
(Pratt, 1964) and therefore dpσ, v1q  
dpσ, v2q.
We conclude that players with lower risk aversion coefficients are weakly more likely to
choose R, holding other factors constant.
Appendix F.4. Social Preferences
Suppose that utility depends not only on own earnings pii, but also on the earnings of
all other group members. In particular, assume that the utility function is separable and
can be written the following way:
uipai, aiq  Πipai,#Rq   αvpΠipai,#Rqq
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where vpq captures the effect of the payoffs received by other group members.
We assume that ∇1pvppi1, pi2, . . . , pin1qq ¥ 0, that is vpΠipai,#Rqq does not de-
crease if there is no other player whose payoff decreased. A selfish player would be
characterised by α  0, and would take into account only his own payoff. Play-
ers with α ¡ 0 would be pro-social and those with α   0 would be anti-social.
If α ¡ 0, altruism could be modeled by setting vpq 
°
pq, maximin preferences
could be modeled by setting vpq  minpq. R is optimal if the following holds:
dpσ, uq ¸
bPt0,...,n1u
σpbqpΠipR, bq   αvrΠipR, bqsq 
¸
bPt0,...,n1u
σpbqpΠipS, bq   αvrΠipS, bqsq 
¸
bPt0,...,n1u
σpbqpΠipR, bq  ΠipS, bqq   α
¸
bPt0,...,n1u
σpbqpvrΠipR, bqs  vrΠipS, bqsq
The first term is not affected by social preferences because it includes only the earnings
of player i. Notice that ΠipR, bq ¥ ΠipS, bq, @b P t1, . . . , n  1u, that is payoffs received
by other group members are at least as high when i chooses R as when i chooses S. Also,
ΠipR, θ  1q ¥ ΠipS, θ  1q, because if a person is pivotal, choosing R would lead to
the threshold being exceeded and would therefore provide higher payoffs for those group
members who chose R, compared to the case if S was chosen. Thus if a positive weight is
given to the event that θ  1 others will choose R, as we have assumed, the second term
would be increasing in α. The value of dpσ, uq would be higher for players who are more
pro-social, defined by higher values of α, thus for such players R would be optimal under
a broader set of parameter values.
Note that the positive effect of pro-social preferences on R choice holds only if players
make deterministic choices. If choices are stochastic and depend on the payoff difference,
increased pro-sociality may decrease the payoff difference between R and S, making R less
likely to be chosen.
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Appendix G. SVO Slider Measure
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Figure G.8: Six allocation tasks of the Slider measure (solid lines) and the additional task
(dashed line). Each line represents one allocation task, in which subjects choose
one of the 9 allocations on the line.
Appendix H. Instructions
Instructions were identical for treatments HIGH and LOW, except for the disclosure
costs, which are highlighted in red below.
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 INSTRUCTIONS  
 
Welcome to the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully and take as much time as you 
need. The instructions are identical for all the participants with whom you will interact during this 
experiment. 
If you have any questions please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and 
answer your questions. From now on communication with other participants is not allowed. If you do 
not conform to these rules you will be excluded from the experiment with no payment. Please also 
switch off your mobile phone at this moment.  
In this experiment you can earn some money. How much you earn depends on your decisions and 
the decisions of the other participants. During the experiment we will refer to ECU (Experimental 
Currency Unit) instead of Euro. The total amount of ECU that you will have earned during the 
experiment will be converted into Euro at the end of the experiment and paid to you in cash 
confidentially. In this experiment the conversion rate that will be used to convert your ECU earnings 
into your Euro cash payment is: 250 ECU = 1 euro. 
Overview 
This experiment consists of multiple rounds. At the start of the experiment you will be randomly 
matched with 5 other participants. The group will remain constant throughout the experiment so you 
will interact with the same 5 other participants in all rounds. All other participants will face the same 
decision task as you, and you will not know the identity of each other. Every round consists of two 
tasks, a Decision Task and a Guess Task. You will do both tasks in every round, but you will be paid 
either for Decision Tasks or for the Guess Tasks. At the end of the experiment it will be randomly 
determined whether your payment is based on the Decision Tasks or on Guess Tasks. There is a 
chance of 4 out of 5 that your payment will be based on the Decision Tasks and a chance of 1 out of 5 
that your payment will be based on the Guess Tasks.  
Next we will describe what you have to do in each of the tasks. 
Decision Task 
 Your initial balance at the start of round 1 is 400 ECU. 
 In each round you will have to choose either action A or action B. 
 If you choose action B, your round income will be 60 ECU.  
 If you choose action A, your round income depends on decisions of other participants in your 
group. If x or more others (not including yourself) choose A, your round income will be 100 
ECU. If less than x others choose A, your round income will be 5 ECU. For example, if x=2, 
your round income will be 5 ECU if 0 or 1 other participant chooses A and your round 
income will be 100 ECU if 2,3,4 or 5 other participants choose A. 
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 The rounds will be grouped into a certain number of blocks. At the start of a block you will be 
informed about the number of rounds that the block contains and the value of x in that 
block. The value of x will stay the same in every round of the block, and you will be reminded 
about the value of x in every round. 
 Everyone will make decisions at the same time, so you will not know the decisions of other 
participants before making your own decision. 
Table 1 summarizes your choices and possible round income in the Decision Task. 
 
Making your action public or hidden  
 After choosing an action in the Decision Task you will have to choose if you want to make this 
action public or if you want to make it hidden. 
 If you make your action public, all other participants in your group will be informed about the 
action (A or B) that you chose in the Decision Task, but only after the Guess Task has been 
completed. If you make your action hidden, other participants will not know your action in 
the Decision Task. 
 Making your action public will cost you 80 ECU [2 ECU ] . Making your action hidden will cost 
you 1 ECU. This amount will be subtracted from your round income. If your round income is 
not sufficient to cover these costs, the difference will be subtracted from the initial balance 
or from your income in other rounds.  
 Making your action public or hidden will affect only the information that others see, but it 
will not affect their income. Likewise, your income will not be affected by whether other 
participants in your group made their actions public or hidden.  
Guess Task 
 In the Guess Task you will be asked to guess what action, A or B,  some other participant in 
your group chose in the Decision Task. We ask you to report your Guess on a scale from 0 to 
100, where 0 means that you are sure the other participant chose B and 100 means that you 
are sure that the other participant chose A. The participant whose action you have to guess 
(call him “other participant”) will be randomly chosen by the computer. All 5 other 
participants in your group have equal chances to be chosen. 
 You will not earn any ECU from the Guess Tasks, but you will earn some lottery tickets. If your 
payment is based on the Guess Tasks, at the end of the experiment you will play a lottery in 
which you will receive either 4000 ECU or 1000 ECU. The probability to receive 4000 ECU will 
Your choice Your income if x or more other 
participants choose A 
Your income if less than x other 
participants choose A 
A 100 5 
B 60 60 
Table 1: Round income for the Decision Task (in ECU) 
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depend on the number of tickets that you received in one of the Guess Tasks. Which Guess 
Task is used will be determined randomly by the computer and every Guess Task has an 
equal chance of being selected.  
 The exact way how the number of lottery tickets depends on your Guess and on the action of 
the other participant in the Decision Task is shown in Table 2. If you guess 0, you will receive 
4000 ECU for sure if the other participant chose B and will receive 1000 ECU for sure if the 
other participant chose A. If you guess 100, you will receive 4000 ECU for sure if the other 
participant chose A and will receive 1000 ECU for sure if the other participant chose B. All 
other Guesses give a positive probability to receive either sum. Notice that as you increase 
your Guess, you receive more tickets if the other participant chose A but receive less tickets 
if the other participant chose B.   
Your Guess 
Number of lottery 
tickets that you will 
receive if other 
participant chose A in 
the Decision Task 
Number of lottery 
tickets that you will 
receive if other 
participant chose B in 
the Decision Task 
0 0.00 100.00 
5 9.75 99.75 
10 19.00 99.00 
15 27.75 97.75 
20 36.00 96.00 
25 43.75 93.75 
30 51.00 91.00 
35 57.75 87.75 
40 64.00 84.00 
45 69.75 79.75 
50 75.00 75.00 
55 79.75 69.75 
60 84.00 64.00 
65 87.75 57.75 
70 91.00 51.00 
75 93.75 43.75 
80 96.00 36.00 
85 97.75 27.75 
90 99.00 19.00 
95 99.75 9.75 
100 100.00 0.00 
Table 2 Number of lottery tickets received in the Guess Task 
 Notice that Table 2 lists the payoffs only for the multiples of five, but you are free to choose 
any number between 0 and 100. To make it easier to choose, we will first ask you to choose a 
multiple of five, and then allow you pick a more precise Guess by showing earnings for 11 
numbers closest to the one you picked. For example, if in the first table you choose number 
50, you will be given numbers 45-55 to choose from in the second table.  
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 Your choice in the Guess Task only affects your payoff. It does not affect the payoffs of other 
participants. 
 
What you will see at the end of a round 
After both the Decision Task and the Guess Task have been completed, you will see the following 
information on the screen: 
 Your choice in the Decision Task 
 The number of other participants in your group who chose action A and made it public 
 The number of other participants in your group who chose action B and made it public 
 The number of other participants in your group who made their action hidden 
 Your payoff from the Decision Task 
You will not know the choices of participants who made their choices hidden. 
Information about your choices and choices of other participants in previous rounds will always be 
available on the right side of your computer screen.  
You will not receive any feedback about the Guess Task. The choice of a randomly selected 
participant and the number of lottery tickets that you earned in every round will be displayed at the 
end of the experiment.  
How your cash earnings will be determined 
At the end of the experiment it will be randomly determined whether you are paid for the Decision 
Tasks or for the Guess Tasks. There is a chance of 4 out of 5 that you will be paid for Decision Tasks 
and there is a chance of 1 out of 5 that you will be paid for Guess Tasks. Note that if you are paid for  
80% 20% 
Sum of earnings 
from Decision Tasks 
Play a lottery 
p% (100 – p)% 
4000 ECU 1000 ECU 
Your earnings  
Figure 1. How your earnings from Part 1 will be determined. p is the number of lottery 
tickets that you got from one randomly chosen Guess Task. 
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Decision Tasks, your choices in the Guess Task will not influence your final earnings. If you are paid 
for Guess tasks, you will not receive the earnings that you made in the Decision tasks.    
If your payment is based on Decisions Tasks, your final earnings will be determined by adding your 
round income from all Decision Tasks to the initial balance of 400 ECU.  
If your payment is based on Guess Tasks, your total earnings will be either 4000 ECU or 1000 ECU. 
Which sum you will receive will be determined by spinning a virtual Lottery Wheel. The Lottery 
Wheel will have two sectors, Red and Blue, and will randomly stop in one of them. If the Lottery 
Wheel stops in the Red sector, you will receive 4000 ECU; if it stops in the Blue sector, you will 
receive 1000 ECU. The size of the Red sectors will be determined by the number of lottery tickets 
that you received in one Guess Task. For example, if you earned p lottery tickets, p% of the lottery 
wheel will be colored Red and the remaining (100 - p)% will be colored blue. Therefore the 
probability that you will receive 4000 ECU will be p%  and the probability that you will receive 1000 
ECU will be (100-p)% . Which Guess Task is used to determine the size of the Red sector will be 
determined randomly by the computer and all Guess Tasks have equal probability to be selected. The 
spin of the virtual Lottery Wheel will be performed on your computer screen at the end of the 
experiment. 
How it will be determined if you are paid for the Decision Tasks or for the Guess Tasks 
At the end of the experiment we will ask you to choose a number between 1 and 5. Afterwards we 
will ask one participant in this room to randomly draw one card out of 5 cards, numbered from 1 to 
5. The draw will be public, so everyone will be able to observe what number has been drawn. If the 
drawn number is the same as the number that you entered, your payment will be based on the 
Guess Tasks. If the drawn number is different from the one that you have entered, your earnings will 
be based on the Decision Tasks. 
What you will see at the end of the experiment 
At the end of the experiment you will be informed about the choices of all participants in all rounds 
and your earnings from all Decision Tasks and all Choice Tasks. You will see if you are paid for the 
Decision Tasks or for the Guess Tasks. If you are paid for the  Guess Tasks, you will see the result of a 
virtual Lottery Wheel spin.  
After you have made decisions in all rounds, but before seeing the final feedback screen you will 
have to do some additional tasks in which you will have a chance to earn more ECU. Instructions for 
these additional tasks will be shown on your computer screen. After these tasks you will see your 
total earnings from the experiment. We will also ask you to complete a short questionnaire. After 
completing the questionnaire, please stay seated until we ask you to come to receive your earnings 
from the experiment. Your earnings will be paid in cash and in private. 
If you have any further questions, please raise your hand now. 
In order to ensure that everybody has understood the instructions, we will ask you to answer a few 
questions. Please click a button on your computer screen to start answering these questions.  
Appendix I. Screenshots
Figure I.9: First part of the questionnaire that had to be answered before subjects could start
the experiment.
Figure I.10: Second part of the questionnaire that had to be answered before subjects could
start the experiment. Values for the first question were generated randomly.
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Figure I.11: Action choice stage
Figure I.12: First part of the belief elicitation task
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Figure I.13: Second part of the belief elicitation task
Figure I.14: Decision tree 1 from the task measuring farsightedness.
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Figure I.15: Decision tree 2 from the task measuring farsightedness.
Figure I.16: Decision tree 3 from the task measuring farsightedness.
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